1
INTRODUCTION
2
CONTROLLING TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION IN THE MILITARY
2.1
Command Technology
2.2 The Prussian General Staff
2.3 The American Practice of Systems Analysis
3
THE HEYDAYS OF SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
3.1
The Cold War Planning Scenario
3.2
What is Systems Analysis?
3.3
The Art of Systems Analysis
3.4
What is a Fair Price to Pay for a Weapon System?
3.5
Acquisition of the War Machine
4
THE DECLINE AND FALL OF SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
4.1
The Cold War Scenario Ceases to be Predictive
4.2
Modeling and Simulation Replaces Systems Analysis
4.3
The Birth of Network Centric Warfare
4.4
Network Centric Warfare and Command Technology
5
A CRITICAL VIEW OF NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE
5.1
The Economic Provenance of Network Centric Warfare
5.2
Network Centrism: Network Centric Warfare as Ideology
5.3
The Centrality of Information Superiority
5.4
Retiring the Platform-Centric War Machine
5.5
The Self-Defeating Character of Network Centrism
6
THE DESTRUCTIVE CONSEQUENCES OF NETWORK CENTRISM
6.1
A Relentless Drive for Innovation May Hurt Security
6.2
Wishful Thinking Becomes Strategy
6.3
Bureaucracy Takes Over the Dynamics of War
6.4
Command and Control Loses Its Human Dimension
6.5
Machines Replace Humans
6.6
Overwhelming Power Disdains War Diplomacy
7
BRINGING COMMAND TECHNOLOGY UNDER CONTROL AGAIN
7.1
Replacing Scenario with a New Planning Paradigm
7.2
Reinstating the Primacy of Systems Analysis
8
THE LIMITS OF NETWORK CENTRISM
8.1
The Limits Imposed by Enemy Deception
8.2
The Limits Imposed by Enemy Evasion While Under Attack
8.3
The Limits Imposed by the Human Character
8.4
Buying Individual Human Proficiency
8.5
The Man-Machine Debate
9
NETWORK CENTRISM CHASTENED
9.1
Underestimating Our Enemy
9.2
Overestimating Ourselves
9.3
Reorienting the Acquisition Process
10.
CONCLUSION
APPENDICES
A
THE RETENTION MODEL
B
THE AUTOMATION MODEL
INDEX |
