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Abstract. Much attention is paid in the management literature as to
why software-intensive command and control projects fail during the acquisition
process. But many do enter service successfully only to fail
during operational use, sometimes catastrophically. The author suggests that quite
fundamental differences between the natural characteristics of command and the
virtual rule-bound properties of software are a major cause of
these catastrophic incidents. Some well-publicised examples are used to illustrate
the extent of the breakdown between command and automation that
can occur in real operations. Since in the future, it
is likely that military operations will be more complex and
unpredictable than those of the past, the author suggests that
Military Users should be increasingly on guard to prevent technological
hubris from constraining the operational flexibility of future systems. It
is suggested that Military Users should take an active leadership
role alongside Industry in the procurement process to ensure the
'Risky Dualism' between command and automation is addressed during system
design, and not when it is too late.
Related topics:
command and control, art of war, command systems
View first page of "Mills: Command and Automation - A Risky Dualism?"
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