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Abstract. It has been claimed that, for the most part, meaningful
IO doctrine is non-existent. This paper explores that claim focusing
on US IO doctrine. First, internal issues relating to doctrine
architecture are examined. Possible uses of information operations contained in
the doctrine are broad, but can be viewed as going
some way to incorporate the potential of information operations into
the relatively static environment of doctrine. Doctrinal information operations components
include a variety of activities that influence the information domain,
and these too are generalized enough to accommodate development in
IO. However, staff structures and processes on which current US
IO doctrine is based are ill-suited to IO. In addition,
the doctrine fails to adequately deal with vulnerabilities derived from
connectivity between the DII and deployed force networks, and an
over-emphasis on the role of IT in IO introduces weaknesses
into IO doctrine. Secondly, external issues are addressed. Legal problems
associated with the conduct of IO compromize the meaningfulness of
IO doctrine, as do problems encountered when conducting IO in
multinational environments. Also, the lack of adequate national IO policy
adversely affects both the conduct of information operations and the
ability to protect military IO vulnerabilities. Overall, although current US
IO doctrine contains much that is useful, the points of
weakness are fundamental and do indeed significantly degrade the overall
meaningfulness of IO doctrine as it stands today.
Related topics:
information operations, doctrine, asymmetric warfare, terrorism, command systems
View first page of "Brosnan: Information Operations - How Meaningful is IO Doctrine?"
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