|
Abstract.
Martin van Creveld, the eminent military historian, said of the
original edition of this book, first published in 1987, that
it '... is brilliant'[1], and elsewhere described it first chapter
as '... written in heaven.'[2] More recently, Robert Leonhard, the
American military analyst said that in Strategy 'Luttwak demonstrates his
status as one of the greatest American military thinkers' and
considers it 'A fine work that deepens the understanding of
the dialectic nature of warfare and is absolutely foundational to
my theory of combined-arms warfare.'[3] Surely, having already been reviewed
as glowingly as this, there is no need for a
further edition or, indeed, review. Yet not so, for as
Edward Luttwak says 'Once the original edition was consigned to
the printers, I did not cease to study strategy and
war, nor did I stop working professionally, in practical ways
in the field and as an adviser. Whether from theory
or practice, the original idea continued to evolve'.[4] The core
of Luttwak's understanding of war is what he describes as
its 'paradoxical logic' where any action will become ultimately self-defeating.
This understanding draws on Clausewitz's 'culminating point' but then extends
it to be the central insight necessary to understand war.
Luttwak considers that most practitioners of war come to grief
because they never understand or hedge against this paradoxical logic,
but continue to apply the linear logic, that is that
more is better, which Luttwak considers applies in all situations
other than the adversarial war or war-like setting. The arguments
he advances for this concept are not easily precised and
deserve to be read in Luttwak's original fluent clarity. Luttwak
follows this paradoxical logic through what he describes as the
five levels and two dimensions of strategy. The five levels
are the technical, the tactical, the operational, the theater strategic
and the grand strategic. All of these levels are important
in their own right, but it is their interaction that
is critical and must be understood. Ultimately, success at a
lower level may be valueless if counteracted by irrelevance or
failure at a higher level. The two dimensions are the
impact of the paradoxical logic between the levels (the vertical
dimension) and within each level (the horizontal dimension). Luttwak illustrates
this interaction by a series of examples based on the
much anticipated, but ultimately non-existent clash of Soviet and NATO
ground forces on the European Central Front. This example draws
on his earlier edition and might appear dated, but is
used very effectively to show the importance of examining any
situation in its depth, not just at the level that
best suits the point being made. Throughout this book Luttwak
repeatedly shows how this in-depth analysis debunks quick fix theories
based on the proliferation of cheap, specialized wonder weapons as
panaceas. Edward Luttwak illustrates his book with relevant examples and
engaging descriptions. For example he provides simply the best and
clearest description of the concept of 'friction' I have ever
read. Similarly his description of the interactions of nuclear deterrence
clarified issues that I had sensed, but never clearly understood.
This book is worthwhile reading for these minor insights alone.
The first major addition that Edward Luttwak brings to the
revized edition is a discussion of 'post heroic' war, a
term he coined to describe the unwillingness of modern industrial
nations to engage in war if any friendly casualties are
likely. This is a deeply disturbing thought for those who
see force as a useful, natural and necessary adjunct to
diplomacy and the exercise of power. The other major addition
is a discussion of the value and place of airpower
in the age of 'routine precision'. Both of these are
critical issues for those who want to understand what modern
war 'is', rather than what it should be. Luttwak's discussion
of both issues is thoughtful, illuminating and ultimately largely convincing.
My one quibble with this book is with Luttwak's title.
His real subject is 'War', not simply strategy, and he
ranges fluently across this wider subject. I can only suspect
that he avoided this simpler title because an earlier and
more famous book has a mortgage on the word. I
think Luttwak's book can stand the comparison, and will certainly
be easier to read and less obscure to the average
modern reader. If I were to teach strategic studies, this
book would be the text I would choose. Rather than
a theory of how to conduct strategy, Edward Luttwak equips
his readers with the tool set to analyze any war
for themselves. If any situation is examined diligently across his
five levels and two dimensions, the student can be sure
that it has been considered thoroughly without the risk of
leaping to simplistic conclusions. Edward Luttwak des his readers the
compliment of leaving them the room to think for themselves,
with his book acting as an informed, intelligent guide to
the 'paradoxical' terrain of war either in the past or
for the uncertain present and future. If you haven't read
this book before and you are interested in understanding war,
or you read it last some time ago, hunt out
and read the new edition. This book's value has been
extended by his revisions and continues to deserve the widest
readership. [1] M. van Creveld, Technology and War: From 2000B.C.
To The Present, Revized and Expanded Edition, The Free Press,
Macmillan Inc, New York, 1991, p. 335. [2] M. van
Creveld, The Transformation of War, The Free Press, Macmillan Inc,
New York, 1991, p. 238. [3] R. Leonhard, The Principles
of War for the Information Age, Presidio Press, Novato, California,
2000, p. 280. [4] E. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of
War and Peace, Revized and Enlarged Edition, The Belknap Press
of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2001, p. xii.
|
|
Related topics:
art of war, book review
View first page of "Book Review: Luttwak: Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace"
Papers by Goyne
Register for the free
to receive a list of papers for each issue as it is released.
|
|
